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1. Introduction 
One of the most extensively examined topics in international finance has been the 
efficiency of forward market for foreign exchange. From early studies such as Fama (1984), to 
more recent ones such as Meredith and Ma (2002), an enormous number of studies have shown 
the failure of forward exchange rate to serve as an unbiased predictor of future spot rate. In 
literature, the robustness of the puzzle has been tested in multiple aspects, including different time 
periods (e.g. Zhou and Kutan (2005)), different countries (e.g. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000)), 
different maturities (e.g. Chinn and Meredith (2004)), etc. This paper inspects the puzzle from a 
new angle—different weekdays. It is noticeable that the studies using forward rates with 1-week 
maturity usually take the observations on a particular weekday as the representative of that week, 
but no papers seem to concern if different weekday would generate inconsistent results. This 
paper adds to the literature by examining the day-of-the-week effect in the relationship between 
current forward rate and future spot rate.  
The paper first tests the forward premium puzzle by using 1-week forward rates across 
weekdays. The results are interesting yet intriguing: there does exist an inconsistency across 
weekdays. Specifically, for all currencies, Thursday consistently appears to be a special day on 
which the puzzle disappears, while it is present on other weekdays. In addition, for Euro, Monday 
is also found to be a similar special day. These empirical findings, which have not been reported 
in literature before, can be called the Thursday effect of forward premium puzzle
1
.  The further 
robust test shows that the effect is significant only when the span of sample period is long 
enough.  
The paper attributes the effect to the monetary policy announcements made by the Federal 
Open Market Committee (the similar monetary policy committee in the European Central Bank) 
constantly on Tuesdays (Thursdays). The paper argues that the market expectation about future 
spot rate is dominantly affected by such fundamental information so that expectation error can be 
                                                 
1
 The paper will show that Monday effect of Euro is actually the European version of the Thursday Effect.  
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reduced and the future spot rate follows the relationship implied by the theory in the week when 
the information is released. Due to the delivery arrangement that the orders will be settled two 
business days after the transaction date in both the money market and foreign exchange market, 
when the information is released on Tuesday (Thursday in the European case), the arbitrage 
transactions conducted by the investors who want to speculate on the information will be 
completed two business days later, i.e. Thursday (Monday for Euro). Thus the relationship 
between future spot rate and current forward rate on Thursdays (Monday for Euro) is closer to the 
scenario described by the theory, and the puzzle seems to disappear on Thursdays (and also 
Monday for Euro). But since the FOMC does not meet every week (about eight times a year and 
once one month in the European case), the effect emerges only when the sample period is long 
enough. The empirical tests provide evidence supporting such an explanation.  
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, it provides new empirical evidence that 
deepens the forward premium puzzle. This evidence shows that the forward premium puzzle 
depends on the day of the week. Second, the paper proposes an explanation that has solid intuitive 
foundation. As summarized in Engle (1996), the explanations for the puzzle basically can be 
divided into two categories -- time varying risk premium and irrational expectations. And the 
findings in this paper tend to support the second category. The paper is also related to the 
literature of exchange rate dynamics. A lot of studies show that there is a lack of connection 
between spot rate and macroeconomic variables, but as shown in Simpson et. al (2005), the spot 
rate does respond to fundamental shocks such as the announcements of interest rate. The findings 
in the paper are consistent with such stylized facts.  
The rest of the paper is structured as below: section 2 reports the new empirical evidences 
about the forward premium puzzle, section 3 proposes an explanation, section 4 tests the tentative 




2. Empirical findings 
The data employed in this paper were extracted from DataStream and contain dollar rates for 
several major currencies, including the Canadian Dollar (CAD), Euro (EUR) and Japanese Yen 
(JPY). Both spot and 1-week forward exchange rates were collected on a daily basis for each of 
these currencies. The CAD and JPY data cover the period between 10/27/1997 and 11/15/2004, 
and the EUR data start from 1/4/1999 and end at 11/15/2004. All weekend rates were excluded.  
Suppose tt ss ,τ+ are the logarithms of the spot rates at time τ+t  and t  respectively 
and τ,tf  is the logarithm of the forward exchange rate with maturityτ at time t . A typical test for 
the unbiasedness hypothesis of the forward rate is: 
τττ εβα ++ +−+=− ttttt sfss )( ,  .                                       (1) 
As argued by Breuer (1996), whether or not the settlement date of the forward contract 
matches the settlement date of future spot trading should be examined for the test. In our case, 
since we are using forward contracts with 1-week maturity, the question is whether or not the 
future spot rate in equation (1) should be exactly 7 days ahead of the current spot rate. According 
to Grabbe (1995), to determine the one week forward settlement date for forward trading that 
takes place today, first determine the spot settlement date, and then the same day of the next week 
is the settlement date of the forward contract. For example, for a EUR/ USD 1-week forward 
contract entered into on Monday, the spot settlement date will be two business days after
2
 (i.e. 
Wednesday), and thus the delivery date of the forward contract should be next Wednesday. To 
speculate on this contract, a speculator should trade currency in the spot market next Monday, 
with the delivery date being next Wednesday. Due to this intuitional arrangement, the forward 
rate on any day of the week is associated with the spot rate exactly one week later. Therefore the 
future spot rate used in the test should be the spot rate exactly one week after the transaction date.   
                                                 
2
 Spot settlement date is two business days after the transaction date except for Canadian dollar and 
Mexican Peso against U.S. dollars in North America.  
 5 
Thus, by construction, 1-week forward rates are regressed with weekly spot returns. 
Therefore the frequency of the data and maturity of the contracts do not overlap in the estimation, 
and serial correlation of error items can be ignored here. However, it is well known that spot 
returns have time-varying volatility in the second conditional moments. To avoid the inefficiency 
of the estimation caused by heteroscadicity, the Newey-West estimator for the standard errors is 
applied in the estimation.  
Table 1 reports the results. For the CAD, the betas on all weekdays other than Thursday are 
significantly negative numbers (around -5 in our sample). In contrast, the beta on Thursday is       
-0.46, and an insignificant t-statistics (-0.78) suggests that the beta is not statistically different 
than zero. For the EUR, Thursday also generates an insignificant result. In addition, the beta on 
Monday appears to be statistically insignificant and close to zero as well, while other weekdays 
have significantly negative betas around -6. For the JPY, although none of the weekdays show a 
significant result, the inconsistency between Thursday (beta is -0.56) and other weekdays (betas 
are from -1.18 to -2.02) is still noticeable. Thus, a new pattern never reported before can be found 
in the table: instead of a significantly negative number like other weekdays, the beta on Thursday 
is statistically equal to zero across currencies. Additionally, Monday is a similar special day for 
the Euro. This pattern can be called the Thursday effect of the forward premium puzzle
3
  
To test the robustness of the finding across various subperiods within the entire data period, a 
rolling regression was applied for each weekday. In the regressions, a window is chosen that is 
shorter than the entire data coverage. Beginning at the first instance of this window, equation (1) 
is used to regress the data within the window and obtain one result. Then, moving the window 
one position forward and regressing the data in the next window generates another result. This 
process continues until the bottom of the window reaches the end of the data. Thus, multiple 
estimates can be obtained for each weekday to determine whether the new finding is consistent 
                                                 
3
 The rest of the paper will argue and show that both the Thursday effect across the currencies and Euro’s 
Monday effect are caused by the similar reasons, and the latter is actually a European version of the 
Thursday effect.   
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across subperiods. The results are illustrated in histogram figure (1) through (3). Each sub-figure 
of the figure illustrates the distribution of the betas associated with various weekdays (row of the 
figure matrix) and the choice of window periods (column of the matrix).  
As we can see from the last column of the figures, in a long window period (6-year for 
CAD and JPY, 5-year for EUR), the betas on Thursdays fall in a narrow interval between -0.5 to 
0.5, while the results on other weekdays are significantly negative (-3 to -5 for CAD, -4 to -6 for 
EUR, -1 to -2 for JPY). In contrast, in shorter window periods (left two columns of the figure), 
the betas are mostly distributed around zero and the differences between Thursday’s distribution 
and other weekdays’ are not clearly identifiable. In addition to Thursday, Monday also appears to 
be a special day for Euro. On that day, the majority of betas are clustered around 0 rather than 
some significant negative numbers in the long window period, and such an inconsistency can not 
be seen either in shorter window periods. Therefore, two conclusions can be drawn from these 
figures. First, the Thursday (Monday) effect is robust across subperiods; second, the effect 
emerges only when the estimation period is long enough.   
In summary, the new findings about the puzzle discovered by the paper are: 1) Thursdays 
generate different results than other weekdays across currencies. 2) Mondays behave similarly for 




The proposed explanation in this paper arises from the effort to answer the key question: 
under what condition can beta be close to zero
4
.  I derived the condition based on a simple factor 
                                                 
4
 Initial effort to find an explanation focuses naturally on whether abnormal events or information in the 
foreign exchange market take place constantly on Thursday, but it did not succeed 
 7 
model of exchange rate that follows Backus et. al.(2001). In this model, the forward premium, 
according to CIP 
5
, equals interest rate differential. i.e.,  
tttt rrsf −=−
*                                                         (2) 
where tt rr ,
*
are the logarithm of foreign and domestic interest rates respectively. Preliminary 
data examination shows that the two interest rates are highly correlated. Also, Anh (2004) found 
that common factors can explain over 90% of the variation of the interest rates. So we can assume 
that both countries’ yield rates are affected by some common factors, but the way the rates are 





constant coefficients, thus domestic and foreign interest rates can be written as:  






* αα +=                                                        (4) 
Only two common factors are included in this setup because of the following reasons. First, Ding 
(2007) found that two common factors would account for almost all variation of the interest rate 
explained by the common factors; Second, intuitively there are two types of information in the 
market: fundamental and non-fundamental information, which can be represented by the two 
factors respectively; Third, according to Baillie and Bollerslev (1994), both properties of high 
persistency and random walk can be found in the forward premium. Usually, fundamental 
information such as macroeconomic variable is highly persistent and pretty stable, while non-
fundamental information is independent across time and much more volatile. So this setup can 
also accommodate the statistical features of the forward premium.  
Without losing generality, I assume that tz ,1  represents fundamental information and tz ,2  
reflects the non-fundamental information. An interest rate differential can be obtained from 
equations (3) and (4): 
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1 )()( αααα −+−=−                                           (6) 
The future spot exchange rate is structured as forward rate plus risk premium, i.e.:  
t1 premiumrisk ε++=+ tt fs  
where 
tε is an error term with standard normal distribution. The risk premium is certainly 
affected by the latent factors tt zz ,2,1 ,  as well. Assume 
tt zz ,22,11premiumrisk λλ +=  
where 
21 ,λλ are constant coefficients. Therefore, we have: 
ttttt zzf ελλ +++=+ ,22,111s                                                  (7) 
Subtracting current spot rate on the both sides of equation (7) results in: 
ttttttt zzsfss ελλ +++−=−+ ,22,111                                         (8) 
Plugging equation (6) into equation (8) results in: 
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Since the non-fundamental variable is believed to be much more volatile than the 




According to the equation above, the zero beta suggests: 
 
which can be rewritten as: 
0)( 22
*
2 ≈+− λαα  




11 )( λαα +−+=+   
In the equation above, non-fundamental information is canceled out, which suggests that if 
expected spot exchange rate change depends mainly on fundamental information, then the beta 
tends to be zero.   
Meanwhile, an important institutional factor has to be considered. Equation (1) is derived 
from CIP and UIP, while both CIP and UIP are based on the no-arbitrage condition. Recall the 
arbitrage process for the CIP condition by using a 1-week forward contract. First, borrow 
domestic currency in the money market. Second, buy foreign currency in the spot market. Third, 
deposit foreign currency to earn interest and fourth sell the foreign currency at the rate specified 
in the forward contract (sell the foreign currency in the spot market for UIP) one week later. 
According to Grabbe (1995), the delivery date of short-term money market instruments is two 
business days after the transaction date. Suppose a speculator observes information and decides to 
speculate on it on weekday T (T could be any number from 1 through 5). The money will be 














trading in the foreign exchange market. Therefore, information released on weekday T of this 
week should significantly affect the relationship between spot rate on weekday T+2 of the next 
week and forward rate on weekday T+2 this week.  
According to the theoretical model, zero beta on Thursdays means that Thursday’s expected 
spot rate is basically determined by fundamental information. The institutional arrangement 
previously discussed suggests that the fundamental information that dominantly influences 
investors’ expectation of next Thursday’s spot rate should be released this Tuesday. Thus, the 
cause of the Thursday effect should be the answer to the following question: is there any major 
fundamental information that is released constantly on Tuesdays and affects the next Thursday’s 
spot rate significantly? After screening a lot of fundamental information, the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC)’s monetary announcement about the federal fund target rate is found 
to be the most likely candidate. The FOMC, responsible for open market operations in the U.S., 
meets regularly to determine the adjustment of the base interest rate. Interestingly, it is almost 
always on Tuesdays when they meet and announce the adjustment during the coverage period of 
our data. (See table (4)). When such major fundamental information comes to the market on 
Tuesday, market participants are likely to form their expectations of the spot rates for next 
Thursday mainly based on this information. This process explains how fundamental information 
dominates non-fundamental information in determining the spot rates on these special Thursdays. 
It is this scenario which I propose as the explanation of the Thursday Effect.  
For the Euro, in addition to Thursday, Monday also possesses similar properties as 
Thursdays. According to our logic, we expect to see that some fundamental information such as 
monetary policy announcements is released constantly two business days before Monday, i.e. 
Thursday. The fact is that the monetary policy committee in the European Central Bank does 
meet and announce the base interest rate mostly on Thursday, as shown in table 5. So our 
proposed explanation can also explain the Monday effect for the Euro.   
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This logic can also explain why this effect only shows up in long window periods: not 
every Thursday has an announcement. The FOMC meets about eight times a year, and about once 
a month for its counterpart in the European Central Bank. Therefore, the effect is not significant 
enough to emerge in a relatively short window period, as it contains fewer observations of the 
announcement weeks.  
As for other central banks, the monetary policy committee in the Bank of Canada also 
meets on Tuesdays with the same frequency as the FOMC. So the effect of their monetary policy 
announcement should be mixed with that of FOMC and does not cause a different day-of-the-
week effect. The meeting date of the similar committee in the Bank of Japan is fairly random and 
not fixed at one specific weekday. Thus, the Japanese monetary announcement does not cause a 
different day-of-the-week effect either.  
The proposed explanation argues that when monetary policy announcements are made, as 
opposed to non-fundamental information (usually private information), market participants 
consider the news as common knowledge and have similar interpretations of the news. Therefore, 
irrational expectation behavior will be reduced in the foreign exchange market. In this sense, our 
explanation fits in the literature that attributes the puzzle to irrational expectations or expectation 
errors.   
 
4. Empirical tests 
The proposed explanation has two components: the FOMC’s (the European Central Bank) 
monetary announcement is the direct cause of the Thursday effect (Monday effect for Euro), and 
the transmission mechanism is that people expect future spot rate mainly based on the 
fundamental information in the announcement weeks. These two aspects can be used to test the 
proposed explanation. 
A natural way to test the first component is to compare the betas obtained with and without 
observations in announcement weeks. The logic of the test is simple: if the effect is caused by the 
 12 
announcements, then the sample without the observations of the announcement weeks should 
generate a beta consistent with other weekdays. Accordingly, I estimated equation (1) by using 
three different samples: all Thursday observations, Thursdays excluding announcement weeks 
and Thursdays of announcement weeks only. The Panel A of table 2 reports the betas of three 
tests for each currency.  
The results are consistent across currencies. In the sample of all Thursdays, the beta for all 
currencies are pretty close to zero (CAD: -0.4643, EUR: -0.5885 and JPY: -0.5561) and have low 
corresponding t-statistics (CAD: -0.78, EUR: -0.39, JPY: -0.23). Once the observations of 
Thursdays in announcement weeks are taken out, the remaining sample generates dramatically 
different results. The betas become more negative and much further away from zero (CAD:-
5.4351 EUR:-6.7543, JPY:-2.21) and their t-statistics are much more significant (CAD:-2.16 
EUR:-2.53, JPY:-0.93).  The similarity between the Thursdays without the announcements and 
other weekdays can be seen by comparing the preceding betas with the average betas of other 
weekdays reported in the last column of the table. Apparently, the forward premium puzzle 
reappears on Thursday if the observations on announcement weeks are excluded. Moreover, in 
the test using only announcement week Thursdays, insignificant t-statistics suggest that the zero 
beta hypothesis cannot be rejected. For EUR and JPY, the beta even tends to move toward the 
positive side. All these results support the argument that it is announcement week Thursdays that 
significantly change the beta on Thursdays overall and cause the inconsistency with previous 
forward premium puzzle findings.  
Similar tests are conducted for the Euro’s Monday effect and the results are reported in panel 
B of table 2. In this case, the three samples consist of all Monday observations, all non-
announcement Mondays, and only the Mondays with the announcements. The beta based on all 
the Monday observations is -0.0248 with an insignificant t-statistic (-0.01), while the sample 
without the observations in announcement weeks generates a negative beta (-6.3175) with a 
significant t-statistic (-2.17). This latter finding is consistent with other weekdays (weekday 
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average is -5.9245). All these results support the claim that the monetary announcement made by 
the European Central Bank consistently on Thursday is the direct cause of the Monday effect for 
the Euro. 
Finally, we test the second component of the explanation. If our proposed mechanism of the 
Thursday effect is correct, the spot rate should respond significantly to changes in the effective 
federal fund rate in the announcement weeks, but not in other weeks. A simple way to test this 
would be to regress spot rate return on the federal fund rate along with a dummy variable 
indicating the announcement weeks. However, since it is very likely that market participants 
interpret the information in a nonlinear way, such a linear (or even quadratic test) may not be 
conclusive. To avoid the complication of specifying the specific relationship between these two 
variables, I used a sign test proposed by Campbell and Dufour (1995) to detect the response of 
exchange rates to the monetary announcement.  
Let 
tg  denote any conditioning variable that is a measurable function of information set tI , 
and let 








ttg gbybS , 
where 1)(sign =u  for 0>u  and zero otherwise. Under the null hypothesis that 1+ty  has constant 
median 
0b  and is independent of tg , Campbell and Dufour (1995, proposition 1) show that 
)( 0bS g  has an exact binomial finite sample distribution with n trials and a probability of success 
equal to 0.5.  
To apply the sign test in our case, let 
ttt ssy −= ++ 11  and ttt iig −=
* , where 
tt ss ,1+  are the 
logarithm of the spot rates, and *, tt ii are the effective federal fund rate and its foreign counterpart. 








ttttg iibssbS , where 0b  is the median spot 
exchange rate change.  If the interest rate does not have a significant impact on spot rate return, 
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then )( 0bS g  should have an exact binomial finite sample distribution with n trials and a 
probability of success equal to 0.5, which can be verified by a standard proportional t-test. If the 
interest rate does have a significant impact, then a higher federal fund rate reduces the interest 
rate differential (foreign minus domestic interest rate), and according to UIP, should cause the 
domestic currency to depreciate (i.e spot return should be higher). Therefore, if the spot rate 
responds significantly to the announcements, the ratio should be significantly less than 0.5.  
The interest rates used in the test were downloaded from the website of St. Louis Fed and the 
central banks of the foreign countries. The spot returns came from the DataStream. Table 3 
reports the results of this sign test. The ratio in the table is calculated as )( 0bS g  divided by the 
number of observations in each sample. For the sample without announcements, the ratios are 
very close to 0.5 (CAD: 0.5, EUR: 0.53, JPY: 0.48). Low t-statistics (CAD: 0, EUR: 1.19, JPY: -
0.54) suggest that for each currency, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the ratio equals 0.5. For 
the sample with the announcement weeks only, the ratios are significantly less than 0.5 (CAD: 
0.37, EUR: 0.28, JPY: 0.25) supported by the high t-statistics. These results imply that the federal 
fund rate does not significantly affect the spot rate in the weeks without the monetary 
announcements while it does in the announcement weeks. The results obtained from this test are 
thus supportive of the second components of our proposed explanation.  
 
5. Conclusions.  
This article tests the unbiasedness hypothesis of forward rates across weekdays and finds that 
the puzzle seems to disappear on Thursdays across currencies (Monday for Euro as well). More 
specifically, instead of being significant negative number, the beta is statistically equal to zero on 
the special weekdays. Furthermore, the paper finds that this phenomenon only emerges when the 
window period is long enough. This new empirical finding can be referred to the Thursday Effect 
of the forward premium puzzle.  
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The paper proposes an explanation based on a simple factor model of exchange rates.  
According to the model, the beta being zero suggests that expected future spot rate depends on 
fundamental information dominantly. Hence the paper argues that when U.S. monetary policy 
announcements are released regularly on Tuesdays, the speculators would mainly focus on this 
fundamental information forming their expectations of the future spot rate. Meanwhile, due to the 
delivery arrangement that the orders will be settled two business days after the transaction date in 
both the money market and foreign exchange market, the arbitrage transactions conducted by the 
speculators will be completed two business days later, i.e. Thursday (Monday for Euro). Thus the 
relationship between future spot rate and current forward rate is closer to the scenario described 
by the theory on Thursdays (Monday for Euro). Similarly, the Monday effect for Euro can be 
attributed to European Central Bank’s regular release of monetary policy information on 
Thursdays, which are two working days ahead of Mondays. Empirical test of the paper support 
the proposed explanation.  
The paper identifies a calendar effect in the foreign exchange market. So for future 
research, whether a trading strategy can be designed based on this market inefficiency should be 
evaluated. And also, since the paper suggests that the spot rate responds to the fundamental 
information such as the announcement of interest rates, the ability of these fundamental variables 
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Table 1: results for the test of the forward premium puzzle across weekdays  
 






































































Notes: the numbers above parenthesis are estimate of alpha and beta in the test equation 



























Table 2: Test of samples with and without the announcements 
Panel A 






















































Notes: numbers above parentheses reported in this table are the estimate of beta in the test 
equation
τττ εβα ++ +−+=− ttttt sfss )( , . Numbers in the parentheses are t-statistics based on 
zero hypotheses. The equation is tested by three samples respectively, including the observations on 
all Thursdays (Monday for Euro as well), the observations on Thursday (Monday for Euro) 
excluding announcement weeks and observations on Thursdays (Monday for Euro) with the 
announcement only.   
*What reported under the average of other weekdays are the mathematical average of beta estimate 



























Table 3: sign test of samples with and without the announcements 



























 over the size of each sample. Numbers in the parentheses 
are the t-statistics of the ratio test. Null hypothesis is the ratio equal 0.5.  The test is conducted by 
two samples for each currency, including the observations in weeks with and without the 


































Table 4: The FOMC meeting dates 
Date Day Date Day Date Day 
11/12/1997 Wednesday 6/27/2000 Tuesday 9/24/2002 Tuesday 
12/16/1997 Tuesday 8/22/2000 Tuesday 11/6/2002 Wednesday 
2/3/1998 Tuesday 10/3/2000 Tuesday 12/10/2002 Tuesday 
3/31/1998 Tuesday 11/15/2000 Wednesday 1/28/2003 Tuesday 
5/19/1998 Tuesday 12/19/2000 Tuesday 3/18/2003 Tuesday 
6/30/1998 Tuesday 1/3/2001 Wednesday 5/6/2003 Tuesday 
8/18/1998 Tuesday 1/30/2001 Tuesday 6/24/2003 Tuesday 
9/29/1998 Tuesday 3/20/2001 Tuesday 8/12/2003 Tuesday 
11/17/1998 Tuesday 4/18/2001 Wednesday 9/16/2003 Tuesday 
12/22/1998 Tuesday 5/15/2001 Tuesday 10/28/2003 Tuesday 
2/2/1999 Tuesday 6/26/2001 Tuesday 12/9/2003 Tuesday 
3/30/1999 Tuesday 8/21/2001 Tuesday 1/27/2004 Tuesday 
5/18/1999 Tuesday 9/17/2001 Monday 3/16/2004 Tuesday 
6/29/1999 Tuesday 10/2/2001 Tuesday 5/4/2004 Tuesday 
8/24/1999 Tuesday 11/6/2001 Tuesday 6/29/2004 Tuesday 
10/5/1999 Tuesday 12/11/2001 Tuesday 8/10/2004 Tuesday 
11/16/1999 Tuesday 1/29/2002 Tuesday 9/21/2004 Tuesday 
12/21/1999 Tuesday 3/19/2002 Tuesday 11/10/2004 Wednesday 
2/1/2000 Tuesday 5/7/2002 Tuesday 12/14/2004 Tuesday 
3/21/2000 Tuesday 6/25/2002 Tuesday   
5/16/2000 Tuesday 8/13/2002 Tuesday   


















Table 5: The European Central Bank monetary policy committee meeting dates 
Date Day Date Day Date Day Date Day 
3/4/1999 Thursday 3/16/2000 Thursday 4/26/2001 Thursday 12/5/2002 Thursday 
3/18/1999 Thursday 3/30/2000 Thursday 5/10/2001 Thursday 1/9/2003 Thursday 
4/8/1999 Thursday 4/13/2000 Thursday 5/23/2001 Wednesday 2/6/2003 Thursday 
4/22/1999 Thursday 4/27/2000 Thursday 6/7/2001 Thursday 3/6/2003 Thursday 
5/6/1999 Thursday 5/11/2000 Thursday 6/21/2001 Thursday 4/3/2003 Thursday 
5/20/1999 Thursday 5/25/2000 Thursday 7/5/2001 Thursday 5/8/2003 Thursday 
6/2/1999 Wednesday 6/8/2000 Thursday 7/19/2001 Thursday 6/5/2003 Thursday 
6/17/1999 Thursday 6/21/2000 Wednesday 8/2/2001 Thursday 7/10/2003 Thursday 
7/1/1999 Thursday 7/6/2000 Thursday 8/30/2001 Thursday 7/31/2003 Thursday 
7/15/1999 Thursday 8/3/2000 Thursday 9/17/2001 Monday 9/4/2003 Thursday 
7/29/1999 Thursday 8/31/2000 Thursday 10/11/2001 Thursday 10/2/2003 Thursday 
8/26/1999 Thursday 9/14/2000 Thursday 10/25/2001 Thursday 11/6/2003 Thursday 
9/9/1999 Thursday 10/5/2000 Thursday 11/8/2001 Thursday 12/4/2003 Thursday 
9/23/1999 Thursday 10/19/2000 Thursday 12/6/2001 Thursday 1/8/2004 Thursday 
10/7/1999 Thursday 11/2/2000 Thursday 1/3/2002 Thursday 2/5/2004 Thursday 
10/21/1999 Thursday 11/16/2000 Thursday 2/7/2002 Thursday 3/4/2004 Thursday 
11/4/1999 Thursday 11/30/2000 Thursday 3/7/2002 Thursday 5/6/2004 Thursday 
11/18/1999 Thursday 12/14/2000 Thursday 4/4/2002 Thursday 6/3/2004 Thursday 
12/2/1999 Thursday 1/18/2001 Thursday 5/2/2002 Thursday 7/1/2004 Thursday 
12/15/1999 Wednesday 2/1/2001 Thursday 6/6/2002 Thursday 8/5/2004 Thursday 
1/5/2000 Wednesday 2/15/2001 Thursday 7/4/2002 Thursday 9/2/2004 Thursday 
1/20/2000 Thursday 3/1/2001 Thursday 8/1/2002 Thursday 10/7/2004 Thursday 
2/3/2000 Thursday 3/15/2001 Thursday 9/12/2002 Thursday 11/4/2004 Thursday 
2/17/2000 Thursday 3/29/2001 Thursday 10/10/2002 Thursday 12/2/2004 Thursday 
3/2/2000 Thursday 4/11/2001 Wednesday 11/7/2002 Thursday 12/5/2004 Thursday 
The format of date:  month/day/year.  













Figure 1: Distribution of the slope coefficient for CAD/USD on different weekdays 



















































































































Notes: Each sub-figure of the figure illustrates the distribution of the betas across weekdays (row of the 
figure matrix) for the choice of window periods (column of the matrix).  Window periods used here are 1.5, 















Figure 2: Distribution of the slope coefficient for EUR/USD on different weekdays 


















































































































Notes: Each sub-figure of the figure illustrates the distribution of the betas across weekdays (row of the 
figure matrix) for the choice of window periods (column of the matrix).  Window periods used here are 
1.25, 2.5, 3.75 and 5 years. These windows are shorter than the windows for CAD and JPY due to the 































































































































  Notes: Each sub-figure of the figure illustrates the distribution of the betas across weekdays (row of the figure 
matrix) for the choice of window periods (column of the matrix).  Window periods used here are 1.5, 3, 4.5 
and 6 years. 
